Monday 20 May 2024

THE INTERPRETATION OF “ACCIDENT” IN ARTICLE 17 OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION AND THE EFFECT ON AIRLINES LIABILITY FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED ON COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS

 

Abstract:

Article 17 of both the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention combine to hold airlines absolutely liable for any accident in which a passenger suffers death or injury if the “accident” occurs on board an aircraft or while the passenger is “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Both conventions however do not offer a definition of “accident” in their respective treaties thereby leading to a lack of uniformity by Courts in defining it. The article focused on the adopted meaning of “accident” in both conventions by the courts globally and its consequence on airlines liability.

Introduction:

Discussions about contracts of carriage by air often raise questions about the issue of airlines liability for injuries sustained by passengers during carriage by air. Article 17 of both the Warsaw Convention[1] and the Montreal Convention[2] combine to hold airlines absolutely liable for any accident in which a passenger suffers death or injury if the “accident” occurs on board an aircraft or while the passenger is “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” The Montreal Convention is adopted into Nigerian law by Section 50 of the Civil Aviation Act[3] and from the date of commencement of the Act, the Montreal Convention became the basis for establishing an airline’s liability for both international and non-international carriage on flights in Nigeria. The underlying effect of the Montreal Convention is that it is preemptive of claims arising under national laws in contracts of air transportation in Nigeria. The implication being that an aggrieved passenger cannot go outside of the Convention to find a cause of action in an aviation claim.[4] This essay will thus examine the disparate meaning of “accident” in both conventions and its consequence on airlines liability.

What is an “Accident”?

The interpretation of the term “accident” in Article 17 of both the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Convention has presented some difficulties traceable to the failure of the drafters of both Conventions to define the term in the respective treaties. The absence of definition has led to lack of uniformity in the definition of “accident” by the Courts. However, many Courts follow the lead of the United States’ Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks[5] where the term “accident” was construed to refer to an “unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger,” and not to “the passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft.” In that case, the court explained that “any injury is the product of a chain of causes, and we require only that the passenger be able to prove that some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.”  Consequently, this has become the established and universally accepted definition of “accident” of Article 17 and, subsequently, adopted and followed by the courts in other state parties to the Montreal Convention.

Article 17 holds airlines only liable for “accidents”, meaning not all injuries occurring on a flight will result in a violation of both conventions. Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury. The text thus implies that, however "accident" is defined, it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition, rather than the occurrence of the injury alone. Furthermore, the injury must have been sustained during the normal operations of the aircraft and the knowledge or complicity of the crew members in the events surrounding the alleged accident that led to the injury must be established.[6] Thus the voluntary act of a person other than the passenger which cause harm to the passenger is the critical factor in determining whether the injury was an “accident” within the definition of Article 17. The causation event must be external to the passenger to ground a cause of action.[7]

An “accident” under Article 17 must arise from “such risks that are characteristic of air travel” thus where the putative injuries were caused by torts committed by fellow passengers and not related to the operation of the aircraft it will not apply. For instance, in Beverley Anne Barclay v British Airways PLC,[8] an injury sustained from a hot coffee spillage by a crew member – an event, unexpected by the passenger, and arising from a source external to the Claimant, was held to meet the definition of ‘accident’[9] while in Mansoor v. Air France KLM Airlines,[10] Plaintiff passenger sued airline after tripping and falling while onboard the aircraft.[11] The court held this to be an “accident” because Plaintiff “tripped and fell as a result of a hazard in the walkway onboard the aircraft” whereas in Stone v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,[12] the Court held that an injury caused by being punched without provocation by another passenger is not an accident because it was not “derived from air travel”. Also in Price v. British Airways,[13] injury caused by a fistfight between two passengers was held not be an “accident” because “a fracas is not a characteristic risk of air travel nor may carriers easily guard against such a risk through the employment of protective security measures.” However, in other instances of fisticuffs the airline has been found liable because they served alcoholic beverages.[14] In other words, an assault by a fellow passenger would not constitute an Article 17 accident absent some causal role of airline personnel. It must be shown that the crew had a “practical ability to influence” the circumstances which brought about the injury causing event. The onus is on the passenger to establish that the “event or happening” was clearly related to aviation operations as non-aviation related causes are not relevant. Aviation operations are as articulated in Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, Inc.[15] i.e.:

·         the normal operations of the aircraft;

·      the knowledge or complicity of the crew members in the events surrounding the alleged accident;

·         the acts of fellow passengers whether intentional or not;

·         the acts of third persons who are not crew or passengers, e.g., hijackers and terrorists;

·         the location of the occurrence in the continuum of the air travel;

·         the role, condition and reaction of the complainant in connection with the occurrence at issue and;

·         the kinds of risks inherent in air travel.

Bodily Injury:

An airline cannot be liable under Article 17 when an “accident has not caused the passenger to suffer death, physical injury or manifestation of physical injury.”[16] Article 17 also precludes compensation for psychological injuries caused by such an accident, where they are not linked to any bodily injury. In Jack v Trans World Airlines Inc.,[17] the Court held that the "mental injury must be proximate and flow from the physical injury caused by the accident." Likewise, the House of Lords in Morris v KLM,[18] while agreeing that the passengers can only recover damages for physical injuries, held that if the mental injury causes adverse physical symptoms such as stroke, miscarriages or peptic ulcers, then the threshold of the requirement of physical injuries must have been satisfied. Thus according to the House of Lord’s decision, it suggests that passengers can only recover damages for mental or emotional injuries provided they manifest in physical injuries.

For clarity, in order to recover damages for injury sustained aboard an aircraft against the carrier, a passenger must establish that:

·         an accident occurred;

·         that he suffered death or bodily injury;

·         that the accident occurred on board the aircraft when it was in operation or in the process of embarking or disembarking; and

·         that the airline could have taken steps to avoid the accident but was negligent or acted with reckless indifference.

These ingredients must be established before liability can be established against a carrier in a claim for personal injury failing which a claim must fail. In a nutshell, the modern damages format of the Montreal Convention predicates carrier liability solely on the occurrence of an accident within the meaning of Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.[19]

Conclusion:

Liability for injury sustained on a flight arises for the aircraft carrier only in the circumstances set out in Article 17 of the Montreal Convention and the presumption of liability therein does not rest upon a mere “occurrence” of an injury; rather, the passenger's injury must be caused by an “accident” and it must result from a bodily injury occurring on board the aircraft when it was in operation or in the process of embarking or disembarking. Anything short of this will not suffice for an aviation claim. A Plaintiff will fail if it fails to establish that an injury was not the result of anything unusual or abnormal with respect to the operation or condition of the aircraft and if it is not a bodily injury.



[1] Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 (Warsaw Convention).

[2] Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal, 28 May 1999) (Montreal Convention)

[3] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2022.

[4] See: Emirate Airline v. Tochukwu Aforka & Anor. (2014) LPELR-22686(CA); Harka Air Services Ltd. v. Keazor [2011] All FWLR (Pt.591) 1402).

[5] 470 U.S. 392 (1985).

[6] Fulop v Malev Hungarian Airlines, Inc., 175 F. SUPP. 651 (SDNY 2001).

[7] See the decision of the UK Court of Appeal in the case: In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2004] QB 234 where it was held that, for the accident, there must be the external event with the adverse effect on the passenger.

[8] [2008] EWCA Civ 1419.

[9] A slip and fall on snow covered airline steps in Carmelo Labbadia -v- Alitalia (Societa Aerea Italiana S.p.A) [2019] EWHC 2103 (QB) was held to constitute an accident within the meaning of Article 17 of the Montreal Convention 1999.

[10] (S.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 WL 4748166.

[11] In Balani v Lufthansa German. Airlines Corp., 2010 ONSC 3003, the judge found that the carrier’s failure to provide a wheelchair, an event that occurred on board or in the course of disembarking, formed a link in the chain of causation of the passenger’s injuries later sustained in the terminal, and was therefore an Article 17 accident.

[12] 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995)

[13] 91 Civ. 4947 (JFK), (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 6, 1992)

[14] Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc. (1st Cir. 2000) 199 F.3d 68

[15] 175 F. Supp. 651 (SDNY 2001).

[16] Eastern Airlines v Floyd 499 US 530 (1991).

[17] 854 F Supp. 654 (ND Cal. 1994).

[18] [2000] UKHL 7.

[19] Wallace v. Korean Air (2d Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 293, 297.

Tuesday 16 April 2024

CRIMINAL DEFAMATION AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN NIGERIA

 

INTRODUCTION

The emergent trend is for some powerful actors to petition the police to go after anyone that says anything they find offensive in regards to their person or business. Instances abound of people employing the services of the police in settling private disputes but it suffices to highlight a few of such cases to drive home the point. A student, Aminu Adamu, was arrested at his university in Jigawa state on 18 November 2022 and subsequently charged with “criminal defamation” over a tweet he made about the physical appearance of Aisha Buhari, the then first lady who caused his arrest; there is the case involving the renown sex therapist named Jaruma and Regina Daniels, the wife of billionaire politician, Ned Nwoko leading to the arrest and prosecution of Jaruma for "criminal defamation” at the instigation of Ned Nwoko. There are also the more recent cases involving Erisco Foods Limited and a customer (Chioma Okoli) who bought and used one of its tomato paste products and did a review of it on her Facebook timeline which the company found offensive and she was subsequently arrested and arraigned for cyberbullying at the instigation of Mr. Eric Umuofia, the promoter of the company and that of the gospel artist, Nathaniel Bassey that petitioned the police to go after certain individuals who posted on the social media that he may have fathered another renown gospel artist, Chioma Jesus' baby due to the alleged baby's striking resemblance with him.

NATURE OF DEFAMATION

As a preliminary point, generally, defamation, in law, is the act of communicating false statements about a person that result in damage to that person’s reputation. The communication could be oral (slander) or written (libel). In all actions for defamation, the claimant must prove that the statement is defamatory; refers to the claimant; has been published and that the publication was actuated by malice.

Admittedly, by law, defamation could either be a civil tort or a crime in Nigeria. The defamed could either decide to institute a civil action to claim damages or petition the police to prosecute an offender. Criminal defamation finds support under the provisions of Section 375 of the Criminal Code Act where it is provided that any person who publishes any defamatory matter is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable to imprisonment for one year; and any person who publishes any defamatory matter knowing it to be false, is liable to imprisonment for two years. Sections 391 to 395 of the Penal Code for the northern states and the FCT Abuja also account for criminal defamation.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of expression is one of the most essential human rights which is entrenched in several legal documents in the world, be it local, regional or international. Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) states that "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive, impart information without interference by a public authority;" the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981, to which Nigeria is a signatory, makes provision, in its article 9, for the right to receive information and to freedom of expression in Africa; and likewise, freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, enshrined in article 19 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 19 of the UDHR stipulates that: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 

Generally, freedom of expression connotes the liberty of every person to openly discuss issues, hold opinions and impart ideas without restrictions, restraints or fear of punishment. Indeed, true freedom of a person or persons would be elusive if it is not possible to ventilate one’s viewpoint or share one’s opinions with others in the society. Therefore, freedom of expression is one of the essential ingredients of every democratic society. Various courts have ruled that the right to freedom of expression includes saying what may be considered deeply offensive or shocking and that this right may only be tampered with in very special exceptional circumstances.

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

It does appear however like criminal defamation laws like the law of sedition, the law relating to treason and treasonable felony, the Official Secret Act, the Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention, etc) Act 2015 are inconsistent with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the constitution. But it helps to bear in mind that the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by section 39 of the Constitution is by section 45(b) subject to any law reasonably justifiable in a democratic society for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. Section 45(b) is thus deemed to restrict freedom of expression but this ought to be the case only in restricted circumstances and where public policy dictates so. The highly respected Lord Coleridge CJ had this to say on public interest:

"There ought to be some public interest concerned, something affecting the Crown or the guardians of the public peace (likely to be broken by the alleged libel), to justify the recourse by a private person to a criminal remedy by way of indictment. If, either by reason of the continued repetition or infamous character of the libel, breach of the peace is likely to ensure, then the libeler should be indicted; but, in the absence of any such conditions, a personal squabble between two private individuals ought not to be permitted by grand juries, as indeed, it is not permitted by sound law, to be the subject of a criminal indictment.”

In other words, section 45(b) of the Constitution is meant to be narrowly construed in order not to unduly override the fundamental right to free speech. For instance, the European Court on Human Rights confirmed this approach in the Sunday Times Case (Sunday Times v United Kingdom (A/30) (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (26 April 1979), when it ruled that where the principle of freedom of expression is subject to a number of exceptions, such exceptions must be narrowly construed. Thus in a landmark decision handed down by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) in 2013 in the matter of Konaté v Burkina Faso (African Court, Application No. 004/2013 (2013), it was held that imprisonment for defamation violates the right to freedom of expression, and that criminal defamation laws should only be used in restricted circumstances. Additionally, the ECOWAS Court has upheld that criminal defamation and libel laws should be repealed, as evidenced in the 2018 judgment in Federation of African Journalists and Others v The Gambia which “recognised that the criminal laws on libel, sedition and false news disproportionately interfere with the rights of Gambian journalists and directed that The Gambia “immediately repeal or amend” these laws in line with its obligations under international law.”

In the 2016 case of Misa-Zimbabwe et al v Minister of Justice et al, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe declared the offence of criminal defamation unconstitutional and inconsistent with the right to freedom of expression as protected under the Zimbabwean Constitution. In 2012 Rwanda convicted a journalist of defaming the President, but in 2020 the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights found that it violated her right to freedom of expression and that Rwanda’s criminal defamation law violates article 9 of the African Charter. Most recently, in 2018 the Constitutional Court of Lesotho struck down the provisions of the Penal Code relating to criminal defamation in Peta v Minister of Law, Constitutional Affairs and Human Rights, (Constitutional Court of Lesotho, Case no. CC 11/2016 (2018)) stating that they violated the right to freedom of expression as protected in the Lesotho Constitution. 

THE EMERGENT GLOBAL TREND ON CRIMINAL DEFAMATION

Some countries such as the US, UK and Australia have already taken positive steps by repealing criminal defamation laws in their domains as they are deemed to infringe on the fundamental right to freedom of expression. In Africa, some countries have also abolished criminal defamation. On July 27 2001, Ghana repealed its criminal libel and seditious laws, Sierra Leone repealed its criminal defamation laws in 2020. South Africa also recently did the same thing.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has clearly recognised the law of defamation as one of the restrictions to the right to freedom of expression. The concern that provides a basis for decriminalising defamation is its potential to unduly interfere with the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression. The constitution cannot guarantee free speech while a lesser law(s) takes away that right. The time has therefore come to repeal criminal defamation laws or have them reformed in line with emergent global trend decriminalising defamation.

The offence of criminal defamation is widely opposed, most notably by the United Nations (UN) and the Africa Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) who have both urged states to reconsider such laws. For instance, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) General Comment No. 34 provides that: “States Parties should consider the decriminalisation of defamation and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.” Moreover, Principle 22 of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights’ (ACHPR) Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa calls on states to amend criminal defamation and libel laws in favour of civil sanctions that are necessary and proportionate. It further states that the imposition of custodial sentences for the offences of defamation and libel is a violation of the right to freedom of expression

It is difficult to appreciate the continued retention of criminal defamation in its present form in our statute books. Obviously, an attack on a person's reputation is a civil matter, which is adequately addressed and redressed by the tort of defamation. This was the position of the Supreme Court in Aviomoh v. C.O.P & Anor (2021) LPELR-55203 (SC) at (Pp 23–25 Paras B — A). The Supreme Court needs to move a step further by declaring criminal defamation unconstitutional as a precursor to repealing the various laws anchored on it.

Any law that is inconsistent with the constitution remains null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. In Arthur Nwankwo v The State (1983) NCR 366 the Court of Appeal struck down on the offence of sedition and held that sections 51 and 52 of the Criminal Code dealing with sedition are inconsistent with section 36 of the 1979 Constitution (now section 39 of the 1999 Constitution). The same approach is needed to decriminalise defamation.

It raises questions when the police move to arrest one party over a verbal dispute involving two individuals or for making a social media post that is deemed offensive even when there is no likelihood of a breach of the peace or public disorder. The role of the Police has been defined severally and has been limited to the prevention, detection, and prosecution of crimes and not involvement in civil disputes among citizens. Written or oral false accusations are simply a tort of defamation and anyone who feels defamed should exercise their constitutional right to seek redress in a court of law rather than involving the police. 

CONCLUSION

Defamation is essentially a private dispute between individuals in which the state has no interest and therefore should have no part to play in it. The dangerous misuse of the criminal law machinery to get reliefs in civil dispute as is presently manifested in criminal defamation needs to be reformed by repealing the laws on criminal defamation. This is because personal squabbles between individuals should not find their way into the criminal docket of any court. The courts should be alert to the abuse inherent in criminalisation of civil wrongs. The right to freedom of expression is not absolute and may be restricted in appropriate circumstances. However, free speech should only be restricted in the interest of public morality or pubic order. In other words, the interest of the state must be involved before the criminal law machinery is invoked.